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ILOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
a right in a manner inconsistent with the social aim or objec-
tive of the right.44 Although Louisiana courts have not yet
utilized the concept of abuse of rights as suggested by Jos-
serand in the area of landlord-tenant relations, such an appli-
cation would provide a sound, logical basis for the prohibition
of retaliatory conduct by a residential lessor.
Even though present Louisiana law does provide pos-
sibilities for the prohibition of retaliatory lessor conduct, Lou-
isiana courts have not yet utilized these options. Legislation
prohibiting such conduct would not only provide protection
for the residential lessee but would also be consistent with
the civilian concept of abuse of rights while providing needed
specificity in the law governing the landlord and tenant rela-
tionship.
John R. Gardner
RECONVENTION FOR DEFAMATION IN THE PLEADINGS:
TOWARD RESPONSIBLE LITIGATION
Defamation has been described as "an invasion of the
interest in reputation and good name."' In Louisiana this
interest receives such high regard that,2 in contrast to the
majority of common law states,3 Louisiana courts extend only
a qualified privilege to statements made by a party or his
has been applied to lease agreements in instances where the lessor has a
stipulation in the lease barring the lessee from subletting or assigning his
lease. Mayrand at 1011.
44. Mayrand at 1000.
1. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 111 at 737 (4th ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
2. E.g., Kennedy v. Item Co., 213 La. 347, 372, 34 So. 2d 886, 895 (1948)
(interest in reputation is an "inalienable right of every man to be protected
.• 1).
3. In order to be protected under the common law absolute privilege, an
otherwise defamatory statement made in judicial pleadings need only be
relevant to the issue in question to be nonactionable. Thus, if relevant, a
false statement made with malice in judicial pleadings would be protected by
the common law privilege, but not by the Louisiana qualified privilege. See,
e.g., MacLarty v. Whiteford, 30 Colo. App. 378, 496 P.2d 1071 (1972); Finish
Allatoona's Interstate Right, Inc. v. Burruss, 131 Ga. App. 572, 206 S.E.2d 679
(1974); Sanders v. Leeson Air Cond. Corp., 362 Mich. 692, 108 N.W.2d 761
(1961); Bromund v. Holt, 24 Wis. 2d 336,129 N.W.2d 149 (1964); 50 AM. JUR. 2D,
Libel and Slander § 238 (1970).
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attorney in judicial proceedings. 4 Therefore in Louisiana de-
famatory statements made in pleadings may create a valid
cause of action in favor of a party injured by the statements. 5
A conflict now exists between the Second and Fourth Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeal on the question of whether the re-
quirements of final determination of the principal suit, appli-
cable to malicious prosecution, also obtains in actions for de-
famation in the pleadings. 6 This note will analyze the differ-
ent approaches taken by these courts and attempt to deter-
mine which approach best protects all the interests involved.
In Louisiana the cause of action for defamation consists
of a statement that was in fact defamatory, 7 that was com-
municated to at least one other person,8 that was false 9 and
made with malice, 10 And that produced damages." After prov-
ing the statement was defamatory and communicated, the
plaintiff is entitled to certain evidentiary presumptions con-
cerning the remaining elements of his cause of action.'
2
4. E.g., Waldo v. Morrison, 220 La. 1006, 58 So. 2d 210 (1952); Sabine Tram
Co. v. Jurgens, 143 La. 1092, 79 So. 872 (1918); Lescale v. Joseph Schwartz Co.,
116 La. 293, 40 So. 708 (1905); Oakes v. Alexander, 135 So. 2d 513 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1961). See also Jones v. Davis, 233 So. 2d 310 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970)
(holding that LA. R.S. 13:3415 (1950), which provides that parties are not
responsible for defamatory statements made by their attorneys, is not
applicable to statements made in pleadings).
5. E.g., Waldo v. Morrison, 220 La. 1006, 58 So. 2d 210 (1952); Lescale v.
Joseph Schwartz Co., 116 La. 293, 40 So. 708 (1905); Sunseri v. Shapiro, 138 So.
2d 661 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962); Oakes v. Alexander, 135 So. 2d 513 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1961).
6. Compare Calvert v. Simon, 311 So. 2d 13 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975), and
Udell, Inc. v. Ascot Oils, Inc., 177 So. 2d 178 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965), with Viera
v. Kwik Home Services, Inc., 266 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
7. E.g., Fellman v. Dreyfous, 47 La. Ann. 907, 17 So. 422 (1895); Spotorno
v. Fourichon, 40 La. Ann. 423, 4 So. 71 (1888); Rougeau v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 274 So. 2d 454 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973); Comment, Defamation: A
Compendium, 28 LA. L. REV. 82, 90 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Defamation].
8. E.g., Sanders v. Times-Picayune Pub. Co., 168 La. 1125, 123 So. 804
(1929); Briggs v. Harrison, 152 La. 724, 94 So. 36) (1922); Rougeau v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 274 So. 2d 454 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
9. E.g., Harris v. Minvielle, 48 La. Ann. 908, 19 So. 925 (1896); Spotorno v.
Fourichon, 40 La. Ann. 423, 4 So. 71 (1888); Rougeau v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 274 So. 2d 454 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
10. E.g., Ford v. Jeane, 159 La. 1041, 106 So. 558 (1925); Sas Jaworsky v.
Padfield, 211 So. 2d 122 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
11. Id.
12. A presumption of malice and falsity must be rebutted by the defen-
dant and the plaintiff need not prove damages in pecuniary form. See Defa-
mation at 91-92.
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Of the several defenses available to the defendant in an
action for defamation, 13 two are relevant when the cause of
action is based upon defamatory pleadings. First, truth of the
statement is an absolute defense in civil defamation. 14 Second,
the judicial privilege protects statements made in judicial
proceedings that are material to the issues in controversy 15
and made with probable cause1 6 and without malice.1 7
While an action for malicious prosecution is similar to the
action for defamation in that it may arise under the same
factual situation and it affords protection to the individual's
interest in his community relations, the misuse of the judicial
process, rather than abusive language, is the basis of the
malicious prosecution action.' The elements of a cause of
action in malicious prosecution include malicious institu-
tion,1 9 without probable cause,20 of the proceeding on which
the complaint is based, and termination in favor of the party
complaining in the malicious prosecution action. 21
The Second Circuit Court of Appeal held in Udell, Inc. v.
Ascot Oils, Inc.,22 and recently in Calvert v. Simon,23 that an
action based on defamation in the pleadings cannot be enter-
tained prior to final determination of the initial suit. In Udell,
the court supported its holding with the assertion that "a
cause for action for defamatory statements set forth in the
pleadings of a civil action does not arise or come into exis-
tence until final determination of such suit,' 24 a rule which
13. See Defamation at 92-94.
14. E.g., LA. R.S. 13:3602 (1950); Deshotel v. Thistlewaite, 240 La. 12, 121
So. 2d 222 (1960); Smith v. Lyons, 142 La. 975, 77 So. 896 (1918).
15. E.g., Dunn v. Southern Ins. Co., 116 La. 431, 40 So. 786 (1906); Lescale
v. Joseph Schwartz Co., 116 La. 293, 40 So. 708 (1905).
16. E.g., Waldo v. Morrison, 220 La. 1006, 58 So. 2d 210 (1952); Oakes v.
Alexander, 135 So. 2d 513 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
17. Id.
18. Cf PROSSER § 120.
19. E.g., Mullen v. Gause, 161 La. 461, 109 So. 31 (1926); Whittington v.
Gibson Discount Center, 296 So. 2d 375 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974); Southern Pipe
& Supply Co. of Miss., Inc. v. Koonce, 255 So. 2d 252 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
20. E.g., Wasserman v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 28 F. 802 (E.D. La.
1886); Southern Pipe & Supply Co. of Miss., Inc. v. Koonce, 255 So. 2d 252 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1971).
21. E.g., Scott v. Citizens' Hdwe & Furn. Co., 180 La. 473, 156 So. 469
(1934); Southern Pipe & Supply Co. of Miss., Inc. v. Koonce, 255 So. 2d 252 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1971).
22. 177 So. 2d 178 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
23. 311 So. 2d 13 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
24. 177 So. 2d at 179-80, and cases cited therein.
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originated prior to the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure
in 1960. It was then not possible to bring a reconventional
demand for defamation in the pleadings because under the
Code of Practice of 1870 the cause upon which reconvention
was based had to arise out of the same transaction and be in
esse and not in its embryonic stages. 25 The second circuit
reasoned that the 1960 Code of Civil Procedure was adopted
as remedial, procedural legislation and therefore could not
create a cause of action that had not existed prior to its
adoption. 26 Although the court's reasoning is logically consis-
tent, its basic premise confuses the elements of two distinct
causes of action by applying the malicious prosecution re-
quirement of final determination of the initial suit to actions
for defamation.
A close reading of the cases cited by the second circuit as
authority in Udell weakens its argument for combining the
elements of the actions for malicious prosecution and de-
famation. In Carnes v. Atkins Bros. Co.,27 combined actions
for malicious prosecution and defamation in the pleadings
were met with a plea of prescription. The Louisiana Supreme
Court's response on appeal, creating the legal fiction that the
injury produced by defamatory statements does not arise
until the original case has been terminated and the relevancy
of the statement determined, ignores the damage actually
inflicted at the time of communication. W. B. Thompson & Co.
v. Gosserand28 dispensed with the issue simply by citing two
earlier cases. The first, Lebovitch v. Joseph Levy & Bros. Co.,
29
applied without explanation the malicious prosecution rule
requiring final determination of the initial action to alle-
gations of defamation in the pleadings. The second, Lescale v.
Joseph Schwartz Co.,30 stated:
Conceding such a rule [requiring the application of the
malicious prosecution final determination rule to de-
famation] to obtain in cases like the present one, where
libel is charged to have been contained in judicial alle-
gations, such a rule could not be applied in the instant
25. La. Code of Practice art. 375 (1870).
26. 177 So. 2d at 181.
27. 123 La. 26, 48 So. 572 (1909).
28. 128 La. 1029, 55 So. 663 (1911).
29. 128 La. 518, 54 So. 978 (1911).
30. 116 La. 293, 40 So. 708 (1905).
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case where the plaintiff was not a party to the suit
wherein the allegations . . .were made.3
The statement is only dictum, rather than an affirmative
mandate concerning the application of the malicious prosecu-
tion rule to defamation in the pleadings. Thus, cited authority
for the rule applied by the second circuit in Udell does not
give convincing reasons for altering the defamation cause of
action by adding the final determination element applicable
to malicious prosecution.
Underlying the approach taken by the second circuit is
the policy of providing the party making the alleged de-
famatory statements the opportunity to prove the truth of
the statements "unencumbered by the necessity of defending
himself before he has a chance to be heard .. -32 Protecting
the judicial privilege and insuring unhampered access to the
judicial process provide additional policy considerations sup-
porting the rule requiring final determination of the initial
suit.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, in Viera v. Kwik
Home Services, Inc.,33 allowed an action for defamation in the
pleadings to be brought by reconventional demand, thus prior
to the final determination of the principal suit. In advancing
this different approach the court correctly distinguished the
actions for malicious prosecution and defamation. The basis
of the action for malicious prosecution, according to the
fourth circuit, is the "malicious commencement or contin-
uance of a suit, without probable cause, for the purpose of
harrassment,"3 4 whereas defamation is founded upon a
"statement tending to harm a person's reputation. 3 5 Final
determination of the suit upon which the action is based is an
essential element of malicious prosecution. In contrast, the
final determination of the initial suit might have no bearing
on an action for defamation in the pleadings because the
party who made the statements could prevail on the merits
and still be liable for immaterial defamatory statements.3 1
31. Id. at 306, 40 So. at 712 (emphasis added).
32. Calvert v. Simon, 311 So. 2d 13, 16 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
33. 266 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 263 La. 368, 268 So.
2d 258 (1972), for procedural reasons, with Justices Barham, Tate and Dixon
dissenting, being of the opinion that the lower court had erred in its decision.
34. 266 So. 2d at 734.
35. Id.
36. For example, in a hypothetical case, Fire Insurance Co. defends a suit
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Another factor influencing the fourth circuit's conclusion
is that the fiction that the damages do not arise until final
determination of the principal suit denies the defamed party
his constitutional right of access to the judicial process.3 7 As
stated previously, damages caused by defamation actually
arise at the time of publication; thus, the injured party is
forced to endure his damages until final determination and
loses interest that would have accrued had the cause of action
been granted at the time the statement was made.38
The approach taken by the fourth circuit seems better
reasoned in both law and policy. First, it recognizes the dis-
tinction between defamation and malicious prosecution by
refusing to require final resolution of the principal demand
prior to hearing the action based on defamation in the plead-
ings. Second, it allows the action for defamation to be brought
through reconventional demand, producing judicial expedi-
ency by allowing the same judge to hear both the main and
reconventional demands, avoiding the needless expense of
repeating testimony in a later trial.39 Third, the Viera ap-
on one of its policies by claiming first that the policy does not cover the
destroyed structure, and in the alternative, that the fire was set in-
tentionally by the insured for the purpose of defrauding the insurance com-
pany. It is determined at trial that the structure was not covered by the
policy. If the alternative allegation was made without probable cause and
with malice, the insurance company would be liable for judicial defamation
even though it prevailed on the merits.
37. 266 So. 2d at 735. LA. CONST. art. I, § 22 provides: "All courts shall be
open, and every person shall have an adequate remedy by due process of law
and justice, administered without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay,
for injury to him in his person, property, reputation, or other rights" (em-
phasis added). Although a literal reading of the article supports the court's
argument, certainly delay in the interest of jistice or judicial efficiency
would not be considered unreasonable.
38. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1921 provides, "The Court shall award interest
in the judgment . . . as provided by law." LA. R.S. 13:4203 (1950), states,
"Legal interest shall attach from date of judicial demand, on all judgments,
sounding in damages, 'ex delicto'. . . ." Defamation is undeniably tortious in
nature; therefore, postponement of judicial demand results in a loss of inter-
est.
39. The action for defamation in the pleadings may be brought in a
separate suit filed while the principal suit is pending, according to the Viera
rule. In addition, LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1038 allows the court to "separate trial
of the principal and incidental actions." Thus, if the interests of the parties
would be prejudiced or if simultaneous trial of the main demand and the




proach avoids postponement of the injured party's recovery
and affords greater protection to the litigant's right not to
be defamed. The integrity of the judicial privilege is not
threatened by the Viera approach because material alle-
gations may still be made without fear of liability. Further-
more, the Viera rule affects only the procedural means to
recovery, not the determination of whether a statement is
actionable.
Perhaps the most significant advantage provided by the
Viera rationale is that it discourages irresponsible litigation.
Granting a more convenient and economical method of en-
forcing his cause of action to the defamed party would force
the parties in litigation to be more precise and responsible in
their pleadings and thus avoid unnecessary injury.
J. David Garrett
MINOR'S MARRIAGE CONTRACT-ABSOLUTE NULLITY?
A sixteen-year-old unemancipated minor and her future
husband executed a prenuptial agreement renouncing the
community of acquets or gains.1 The father of the bride re-
fused to join his wife and daughter in signing the marriage
contract. When the husband instituted a divorce action thir-
teen years later, the wife reconvened for a partition of the
community property, alleging that the separate property
agreement was invalid due to her minority at the time of its
execution and the absence of her father's assistance and sig-
1. A prenuptial agreement, commonly referred to as a marriage contract,
is an agreement entered into by a couple stipulating the financial and prop-
erty aspects of the marriage. S. LITVINOFF & W. TPTE, LOUISIANA LEGAL
TRANSACTIONS AND THE CIVIL LAW OF JURIDICAL ACTS 77 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as LITVINOFF & TftTE]. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2325 permits couples to
stipulate property regimes of their own design provided "they be not con-
trary to good morals." LA. CIV. CODE art. 2332 provides that the community
of gains exists by operation of law when there is no stipulation to the con-
trary prior to the marriage. Marriage contracts are governed by strict re-
quirements. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2328 provides that they must be by notarial
act and article 2329 provides that they cannot be altered after the marriage,
except that couples moving to this state are given a one-year period in which
to make a marriage contract. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329. See H. DAGGETT, THE
COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM OF LOUISIANA 118 (1945), in which the writer
suggests that post-nuptial contracts would make it possible for spouses dis-
satisfied with the community property system to change it and thus prevent
"possible friction" in their marriage.
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